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ventions collectives. Sauf au cours de deux guerres mondiales, en effet, 
les pouvoirs publics n'ont pas jugé opportun d'imposer dans les divers 
règlements ou ordonnances qu'ils ont adoptés concernant les salaires, leur 
ajustement automatique, suivant les fluctuations de la valeur du dollar. 
La détermination des traitements est certes au Canada, comme ail-
leurs, la partie des négociations collectives qui fait naître entre le patronat 
et les syndicats, les plus vives oppositions. Conscients de l'importance 
de ce sujet, ces groupements ont jusqu'à maintenant préféré aborder cette 
matière, dans un esprit essentiellement pragmatique et se méfient géné-
ralement de tout mode de fixation des traitements qui peut leur sembler 
trop systématique. A cet égard, les syndicats eux-mêmes, qui ont pourtant, 
à l'occasion, favorisé l'insertion des clauses d'indexation des salaires dans 
les conventions collectives, ont par ailleurs bien souvent fait montre de 
réticence, en ce qui concerne ce mode de fixation des traitements. Leur 
attitude leur est peut-être dictée par leur crainte que les augmentations 
automatiques accordées aux employés ne soient invoquées lors des négo-
ciations collectives pour les convaincre de leur bien-être relatif et les dé-
courager de toute tentative d'obtenir des gains plus considérables. 
CONCILIATION PROCEDURES IN ALBERTA 
Norman F. Dufty 
Cunningham has recently reviewed the effects of changes in the 
conciliation procédures in several provinces l and it is the purpose of this 
paper to examine the results of the 1968 changes to Alberta Labour 
Act relating to the appointaient of conciliation boards2. Prior to thèse 
changes the failure of parties to collective bargaining negotiations to reach 
agreement unaided or with the assistance of a conciliation commissioner 
resulted in the appointaient of a conciliation board. As the Act now 
stands a conciliation commissioner may recommend to the Minister that 
a conciliation board be appointed or not. If the Minister agrées that no 
board should be appointed then the recommendations of the conciliation 
* DUFFY, Normand F., Dean of Commerce and Social Sciences, Western 
Australian Institute of Technology, Perth, Australia. 
i W. B. CUNNINGHAM, « Conciliation : The End of Compulsory Boards », Rela-
tions Industrielles, 25, 1970, 62-79. 
2 The writer derived considérable benefit from discussions with Professors J. D. 
Muir and A. Melnyk of the University of Alberta and Mr. H. J. H. Libke and T. T. 
Grothen, conciliation commissioners on the staff of the Board of Industrial Rela-
tions of the Province of Alberta. They bear no blâme for this paper's inadequacies 
or inaccuracies. He is also grateful to Mr. French, deputy chairman of the Board, 
for granting access to the files and permission to use the data in aggregate jobs. 
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commissioner hâve the same effect and force as the award of a conciliation 
board (Section 86). 
COMPARISON OF ELAPSED TIMES 
There hâve been many arguments in the literature against the use 
of compulsory conciliation. Sorne of thèse, such as the finite cost of the 
process 3 and the shortage of suitable conciliators4, hâve verged on the 
trivial. Others hâve consistée! mainly of vague and largely unsubstantiated 
comments about the « damage » done by the process to collective bar-
gaining5 and the fact that compulsory conciliation « distracts » the parties 
from the main task, reaching a collective agreement6. However, in terms 
of objective factors, there is little doubt that the compulsory conciliation 
process does lead to lengthy and largely unnecessary delays 7. In order 
to examine the effect of the revised procédures on the time taken for 
the total process, including the voting on the recommendations or awards 
and post-conciliation bargaining, an investigation was made of 50 disputes 
which were handled by conciliation boards in 1968-1969. Thèse were 
comparée to a similar number which were dealt with in 1970 by con-
ciliation commissioner's recommendations. In order to keep one factor 
constant, the comparison was confined to disputes in the private sector. 
The parties are under no obligation to notify the Board of Industrial Re-
lations of the date of the signing of the collective agreement after the 
steps required under the Alberta Labour Act are complète. However, in 
many cases they continuée to use the services of a conciliation commis-
sioner on a completely voluntary basis in the post-conciliation bargaining 
3
 F.R. ANTON, Government Supervisée Strike Votes, (Toronto : CCH Cana-
dian, 1962), p. 123. 
4
 H. A. LOGAN, State Intervention and Assistance in Collective Bargaining, 
(Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1956), pp. 91-93. 
5 H. D. WOODS and S. OSTRY, Labour Policy and Labour Economies in Canada, 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1962), p. 273 and H.D. WOODS, « Canadian Collective 
Bargaining and Dispute Settlement Policy : An Appraisal », Canadian Journal of 
Economies and Political Science, 21, 1955, 453. 
6 ANTON, op. cit., p. 123 ; D.J.M. BROWN, Interest Arbitration, (Ottawa : 
Queen's Printer, 1968), p. 242; and WOODS and OSTRY, op. cit., p. 185. 
7 BROWN, op. cit., p. 241 ; S. JAMIESON, « Labour Dispute Seulement in the 
Construction Industry of British Columbia, 1948-1954», in H.D. WOODS (éd.), 
Patterns of Dispute Settlement in Five Canadian Industries, (Montréal : Industrial 
Relations Centre, McGill University, 1958), p. 249; C. KIDD, «Union View of 
Government in Labour Relations», in F. BAIRSTOW (éd.), The Rôle of Government 
in Industrial Relations, (Montréal : Industrial Relations Centre McGill University, 
1960), p. 73 ; LOGAN, op. cit., p. 91 ; M. K. OLIVER, «Third Patry Intervention in 
the Québec Primary Textile Industrly, 1944-1952», in WOODS (ed.),op. cit., pp. 312-
314 ; W.G. PHILLIPS, « Government Conciliation in Labour Disputes : Some Récent 
Expériences in Ontario », Canadian Journal of Economies and Political Science, 22, 
1956, 525, WOODS in BAIRSTOW (éd.), op. cit., p. 69. 
CONCILIATION PROCÉDURES IN ALBERTA 777 
phase and data were sometimes available on final seulement dates. Ail 
the information is shown in Table 1 and it can be seen from this that the 
number of cases on which information is available on the post-conciliation 
phase is limited. Assuming that the time lapse data on post-conciliation 
negotiations is représentative, the différence between the two methods 
in terms of elapsed time is considérable. Procédures based on conciliation 
board awards take 2.2 to 2.3 times as long as those based on conciliation 
commissioners' recommendations, depending on whether the means or 
the médians are used as a basis for comparison. 
TABLE I 
TIME LAPSE DATA ON DISPUTE HANDLING BY CONCILIATION BOARDS (1968-1969) 
AND BY CONCILIATION COMMISSIONERS * (1970), PRIVATE SECTOR, ALBERTA 
(CALENDAR DAYS). 
Dispute Phase 
Conciliation 
Sample 
Size Mean 
Board 
Médian 
Conciliation Commissioner 
Sample 
Size Mean Médian 
Conciliation and Recom-
mandation Where Appli-
cable** 50 42.2 34 50 39.6 31 
Appointment of Conciliation 
Board 50 56.8 51 Not applicable 
Conciliation Board Re-
commendations 50 48.5 42 Not applicable 
Voting on Recommen-
dations 40 14.3 13 50 18.5 18 
Final Negotiations 12 28.0 26 22 27.3 24 
TOTAL — 189.8 166 — 85.4 73 
COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCIES 
The data reported above establish quite clearly that the use of con-
ciliation commissioners' recommendations rather than conciliation board 
awards is much less time-consuming. The question of whether or not this 
method is more efficient is very difficult to answer. One major difficulty 
is deciding on a measure of efficiency. If one accepts the somewhat pe-
culiar position that work stoppages are constructive social phenomena8 
* Cases in which the conciliation commissioners recommendations hâve the effect and force 
of a conciliation board award. 
** When a dispute is lo be handled by a conciliation board, a conciliation commissioner may 
or may not make a recommendation. If he feels that a recommendation will serve no 
useful purpose, he does not make one. 
TABLE II 
RESULTS OF CONCILIATION BOARD AWARDS (1968-1969) AND CONCILIATION 
COMMISSIONERS' RECOMMENDATIONS (1969-1970), ALBERTA. (PERCENTAGES) 
Conciliation 
Board Award 
Results of Voting 
Employer Employées 
Strike 
Number Percentage Votes Strikes Strikes 
of Cases Accepted* (% Cases) (% Votes) (% Ceses) 
Unanimous 
Union Dissent 
Employer Dissent 
Ail Awards 40 
26 
8 
20.0 
7.7 
0 
50.0 25.0 
63.1 50.0 
75.0 16.7 
12.5 
30.7 
12.5 
Ail Awards Affirmative Affirmative 10 100.0 0 0 0 
»» »» Négative Négative 21 0 71.6 40.0 28.6 
*» M Affirmative Négative 32 0 65.8 33.3 25.0 
»» »» Négative Affirmative 9 0 66.7 16.7 11.1 
Ail Awards 74 13.5 56.9 33.3 18.9 
Conciliation Affirmative Affirmative 20 100.0 0 0 0 
Commissioners' Négative Négative 37 0 32.4 16.7 5.4 
Recommendations Affirmative Négative 35 0 63.0 13.6 8.6 
Négative Affirmative 14 0 50.0 28.5 14.3 
Ail Recommendations 106 18.9 38.7 17.1 6.6 
Received an affirmative vote from both emplovers and employées. 
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then, by reductio ad absurdum, one might conclude that efficiency should 
be positively related to the number of strikes. However, accepting the 
more conventional view, that a procédure which reduces strikes is more 
efficient than one which does not, the percentage of disputes resulting in 
strike action can be taken as one measure of success and efficiency 
inversely related to it. Another measure which may be used, again with 
an inverse relationship, is the percentage of disputes which are taken as 
far as a strike vote and also the percentage of thèse cases which actually 
resuit in a work stoppage. Finally, as both employers and employées vote 
on conciliation board awards and on the recommendation of conciliation 
commissioners, the percentage of cases in which both parties vote in the 
affirmative may also be taken as an efficiency measure. Data on 74 
conciliation board cases in the 1968-1969 period were collected and 
compared to the data on 106 cases in the 1969-1970 period which were 
dealt with by conciliation commissioners' recommendations. The results 
are shown in Table 2. 
As might be anticipated, when a conciliation board award was 
unanimous the probability of it receiving an affirmative vote from both 
employers and employées was significantly higher (p < .05) than if either 
board made a majority award. Similarly, the percentage of disputes result-
ing in strikes was significantly lower (p < .05). There were no signif-
icant différences on other measures. When both sides voted affirmatively 
the award became binding and no strike votes or strikes occurred ; there 
were no significant différences between the other voting patterns. Data 
on the voting behavior on conciliation commissioners' recommendations 
also shown in Table 2 reveal no significant différences between voting 
patterns on any measure after excluding the dual affirmative votes which 
resuit in binding agreements. When the two methods are compared con-
ciliation commissioners' recommendations are superior to conciliation 
board awards on ail measures although only the différence in the percent-
age of disputes resulting in strike action is significant (p < .02). 
Owing to difficulties in making meaningful comparisons the above 
results cannot be taken as being conclusive. The comparison made in 
Table 2 uses over-lapping time periods and an objection may be raised 
on thèse grounds. If we take conciliation board awards for 1968 and 
compare them to conciliation commissioners' recommendations for 1969 
it could be pointed out that the board awards contained a much larger 
percentage of disputes in the public sector than those based on conciliation 
commissioners' recommendations. If the comparison is confined to the 
private sector9 then it could be said that économie conditions in 1968 
8 BROWN, op. cit., p. 252 ;; S. JAMIESON, « Industrial Relations and Government 
Policy 3>, Canadian Journal of Economies and Political Science ,19, 1951, 35-36; 
WOODS in BAIRSTOW (éd.), op. cit., p. 69 ; and WOODS and OSTRY, op. cit., p. 194. 
9 There were insufficient cases from the public sector handled by conciliation 
commissioners' recommendations to make any meaningful comparisons in this area 
alone. 
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differed sufficiently from those in 1969 to invalidate the comparison. Even 
if the comparison is made in the same year in the private sector alone it 
could be argued that the more refractory disputes were sent to conciliation 
boards and the less refractory ones made the subject of conciliation 
commissioners' recommendations. Ail the above comparisons were made 
and in ail cases the conciliation board awards were less successful on the 
measures used than the recommendations of conciliation commissioners. 
Owing to the smaller cell sizes, there were no significant différences at 
the 5% level or better. If the comparisons made in Table 2 are repeated 
after excluding ail public sector disputes the picture remains unaltered 
except the différence in the percentage of cases going to strike action is 
significant at the 1% level, not 2% as before. Nevertheless, even though 
the évidence cannot be taken as conclusive, due to the reasons outlined 
above, it can certainly be taken as strongly suggestive. 
The above results are not altogether surprising. Most of the theore-
tical work done on the conciliation process emphasises, inter alia, the 
rôle of the conciliator as a confidential communication channel between 
the parties involved in the negotiations 10. In conciliation board proceed-
ings the parties hâve représentatives and the board is chaired by an 
individual whose fuU-time job is not conciliation and who may not be 
familiar with the industry or the people involved. This remoteness from 
the dispute is emphasised by the fact that only 20% of unanimous awards 
received an affirmative vote from both employers and employées (see 
Table 2) . On the other hand, the conciliation commssioner is working 
directly with the parties, he enters the dispute at an earlier stage than 
a conciliation board, he is likely to know the parties well, and his full-
time job is conciliation. On a priori grounds, therefore, it is not unreason-
able to assume that he would establish better communications than a 
conciliation board in a situation where the next step is continued bipartite 
bargaining possibly followed by strike action. The conciliation com-
missioner's deeper knowledge of the parties and the dispute are also 
likely to enable to give a superior performance to that of a conciliation 
board in the persuasive phase of the conciliation process n under the 
*0 A. DOUGLAS, Industrial Peacemaking, (New York : Columbia University 
Press, 1962), p. 24 ; J. PODELL and W. M. KNAPP, « The Effect of Médiation on the 
Perceived Firmness of the Opponent», Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13, 1969, 511-
520 ; C. M. REHMUS, « Médiation and Conciliation », Labor Law Journal, 4, 1953, 
141-144 ; C. M. STEVENS, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations, (New 
York: McGraw Hill, 1963), p. 99; and R. E. WALTON and R. B. MCKERSIE, A 
Behavioral Theory of Labor Négociations, (New York : McGraw Hill, 1965), pp. 
119 and 159. 
11
 H.G. LOVELL, « The Pressure Lever in Médiation », Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 5, 1952/1953, 119-127; T. SCHELLING, «The Stratégies of Con-
flict : A Prospectus», Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2, 1958, 236 ; STEVENS, op. cit., 
p. 129 ; and R. WILSON, « Conciliation Officers' Techniques the Settlement of Labour 
Disputes », a paper prepared for the 18th Conférence of the Canadian Association 
of Administrators of Labour Législation, Québec, September, 1959. 
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same conditions so far as the stage of the dispute is concerned. Of course, 
it could be argued that the conciliation commissioner has the opportunity 
to function as a communication channel and a persuader in the earlier 
phase of the dispute in ail cases. But compulsory conciliation followed 
by a tripartite board is a distinctly différent situation from compulsory 
conciliation followed by the conciliator's recommendations on which both 
parties vote. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the data presented hère the alternative procédure 
introduced by the 1968 amendment to the Alberta Labour Act, conciliation 
commissioner's recommendations having the force and effect of a con-
ciliation board award, is considerably less time-consuming than the use 
of conciliation boards. Although conclusive proof of superiority in any 
scientific sensé is not possible, the data suggest that the shorter procédure 
is also more effective. There are a priori reasons to support this. This 
investigation supports Cunningham's conclusions 12 and, to some extent, 
the recommendations of the Task Force on Labour Relations13, that 
conciliation boards should be abolished or made voluntary. However, it 
may be préférable to allow conciliation boards to be appointed at the 
Minister's discrétion when, after seeking the advice of the Board of In-
dustrial Relations, he feels that the one or both of the parties hâve not 
the compétence to conduct responsible collective bargaining negotiations. 
Such occurrences would be rare. 
12
 CUNNINGHAM, loc. cit., 79. 
13
 Canadian Industrial Relations, (Ottawa : Queen's Printer, 1969), p. 169. 
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